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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIA-
TION INCORPORATED, a corpora-
tion, and UINTAH BASIN TELE-
PHONE ASSOCIATION, INC., a cor-
poration, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMIS- J 
SION, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9010 
The defendant is in substantial agreement with the 
statement of facts as set forth by the plaintiffs. There is 
no significant issue of fact. Defendant concedes that if 
Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953 and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, 
as amended, are constitutional, the rhintiffs are entitled 
to the advantages therein contained. The constitutionality 
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of these statutes being the sole issue we here set forth the 
sections for analysis. 
Section 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"Property of cooperative nonprofit electric cor-
porations, organized under this chapter and operating 
facilities financed pursuant to the Rural Electrifica-
tion Act of 1936, shall not be valued for the purpo~e 
of ad valorem taxation in excess of $50 times the 
number of miles of primary distribution of trans-
mission lines." 
Section 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides: 
"Property of cooperative nonprofit telephone 
corporations organized under this chapter and fi-
nanced pursuant to the United States Rural Electri-
fication Act of 1936, as amended, shall not be valued 
for the purpose of ad valorem taxation in excess of 
$10.00 times the number of circuit miles of line con-
stituting the telephone system." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
SECTION 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953 AND SECTION 
16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE 
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT II. 
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17, 
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SEC-
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TION 11, ARTICLE XIII, OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF UTAH. 
POINT III. 
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17, 
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SEC-
TION 26, ARTICLE VI, OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953 AND SECTION 
16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE 
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Section 2, Article XIII of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah provides in part: 
"All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under this 
constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as provided by law. * * *" 
Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah, provides in part: 
"The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all 
tangible property in the State, according to its value 
in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations 
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such 
property, so that every person and corporation shall 
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its 
tangible property, * * * " 
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In State v. Thomas, 16 U. 86, 50 P. 615, this Court gave 
meaning to these sections as follows: 
"* * * The real intent, however, of the 
framers of the constitution, is made more manifest 
in section 3 of article 13, which contains this lan-
guage: 'The legislature shall provide by law a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation on 
all property in the state, according to its value in 
money, and shall prescribe by general law such reg-
ulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of all property; so that every person and corporation 
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, 
or its property.' This provision is closely related to 
the one in section 2, and directs the legislature not 
only to provide a unifor:m and equal rate of assess-
ment and taxation, so that every subject owning 
property shall pay the same rate of tax as every 
other such subject, but also declares that all prop-
erty shall be assessed at a basis which shall be 'ac-
cording to its value in money.' It is evident that the 
term 'according to its value in money' means that 
all property shall be valued, for the purposes of as-
sessment, as near as is reasonably practicable, at its 
full cash value; in other words, that the valuation 
for assessment and taxation shall be, as near as rea-
sonably practicable, equal to, the cash price for which 
the property valued would sell in open market, for 
this is doubtless the correct test of the value .of prop-
erty. The manifest intention is that all taxable prop-
erty shall bear its just proportion of the burdens of 
taxation. These two sections of the constitution har-
monize with each other; and, by reading and con-
sidering them together, it becomes clear that all tax-
able property within this state must be assessed and 
taxed on a valuation fixed at its actual cash value, 
or as near such value as is reasonably practicable. 
* * *" (Italics added.) 
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Heretofore we have set forth Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 
1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended. Analysis of 
those statutes in light of the case authority cited evidences 
a violation of the foregoing constitutional provisions in 
these respects : 
1. Regardless of the full cash value of its property, or 
the cash price for which the property valued would sell on 
the open market, and despite the principle that all tangible 
property shall bear its just burden of taxation, a coopera-
tive identified in the statutes in question enjoys a fixed 
ceiling or limitation on the valuation of its property, quite 
unknown to other persons, associations or corporations. 
Can all property be taxed in "proportion to its value", or 
"according to its value in money" if the valuation cannot 
be "in excess of $50 times" the number of miles of trans-
mission lines, or cannot be "in excess of $10 tim.es the num-
ber of circuit miles" of telephone lines.? Obviously the an-
swer is in the negative. Property cannot truly be taxed 
"according to ~ts value in money" if a monetary limitation 
is placed on the extent of valuation. The Constitution of 
Utah is clearly violated in this respect by Section 16-6-16, 
U. C. A. 1953, and Section 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended. State v. Thomas, supra. 
2. Even though the Utah constitutional provisions 
heretofore quoted make "all tangible property" subject to 
assessment and taxation, with certain exceptions not ma-
terial here, Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, 
U. C. A. 1953, as amended, subject the cooperatives there-
under to ad valorem taxation only to the extent a specific 
type of property is owned by the cooperative. In the one 
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case property of certain cooperative nonprofit electric cor-
porations shall not be valued for the purpose of ad valorem 
taxation in excess of $50 times the number of miles of pri-
mary distribution of transmission lines. Section 16-6-16, 
U. C. A. 1953. A limit of ten dollars· times the number of 
circuit miles of line constituting the telephone system is 
basic to valuation of the property of the cooperative non-
profit telephone corporations under Section 16-6-17, U. C. A. 
1953, as amended. Now, by what magic in taxation logic 
and experience may the required assessment of all tangible 
property be conditioned on the extent of ownership of a 
peculiar species of property? 
There is no necessary correlation between the peculiar 
property basic to the formulae in Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 
1953 and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, and all tangi-
ble property owned by the cooperatives in question. Own-
ership of the former gives no certain indication of the value 
of the latter. Cooperatives may have equal line mileage, 
yet vary in tangible property valuation depending on density 
of customer population, geographical conditions, and the 
type and extent of service required by the customers. Quite 
contrary to producing the true cash value of all tangible 
property of the cooperatives in question, assessment of a 
specific type of property of the cooperative results in (a) 
a valuation of that specific property only for taxation pur-
poses or (b) if a limit on the valuation of the specific prop-
erty is en1braced in the valuation formula, as is the case 
here, the resulting assessment may be only a fraction of 
the full cash value of the specfic property, and a fortiori, 
a smaller fraction of the full cash value of all tangible prop-
erty. 
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3. By adopting the formulae of Sections 16-6-16, U. 
C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, the Leg-
islature of Utah has extended exemptions to the cooperatives 
therein identified in that the full cash valuation is subject 
to a "ceiling", and only applicable to specific tangible prop-
erty. We are of the conviction that the paramount law of 
this state precludes the escape from taxation of that prop-
erty represented by, and to the extent of, the valuation over 
and above the maximum rate set forth in the foregoing 
statutes, and the exemption from taxation of tangible prop-
erty other than that therein specified. 
According to State v. Armstrong, 17 U. 166, 53 P. 981: 
"* * * The meaning and intent manifest 
from the constitution are that no property shall be 
relieved from the burden of maintaining the govern-
ment, except such as was defined and specified for 
exemption by that instrument. No one would con-
tend for a moment that the legislature of this state 
has power in express terms to exempt property from 
taxation, other than that enumerated for exemption 
in the constitution; and yet in the enactment of the 
statute in question the legislature has undertaken to 
indirectly exempt property not so enumerated. This 
is an attempt to do indirectly that which could not 
be done directly, and the statute therefore is in vio-
lation of the constitution, and is void, as in excess of 
legislative authority. To prevent the legislature from 
exempting property not included within the exemp- · 
tions of the constitution, express words of inhibition 
were not necessary. The positive direction that 'all 
property not exempt under the laws. of the United 
States or under this constitution shall be taxed,' and 
that the rate of assessment and taxation shall be 
'uniform and equal,' so that 'every person and cor-
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poration shall pay a tax in proportion to the value 
of his, her, or its property,' with the enumeration of 
the property exempted, contains an implication 
against an exemption of any other property by the 
legislature. That direction itself operates as. a re-
straint upon the legislative power. Cooley, Const. 
Lim. 209; Konold v. Railway Co., 16 Utah 151." 
It appears most fundamental that no exemption from 
taxation may be extended by the Legislature, unless. author-
ized by the Constitution. That no such authority exists for 
the relief from the burden of maintaining the government 
accorded the plaintiffs, we respectfully submit. 
4. As noted, Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitu-
tion of Utah, states : 
"The Legislature shall provide by law a .uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all 
tangible property in the state according to its value 
in money. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
Violative of this provision are the statutes, Sections 
16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended, which permit of taxation neither equally nor 
impartially laid on the taxpayers. The cooperatives identi-
fied by these statutes cannot be treated or classified for 
taxation purposes on a basis distinct and separate from 
other persons, associations, or corporations engaged in the 
same activity and owning property of an identical nature. 
Plaintiffs apparently recognize one aspect of the "uni-
form and equal" principle when they write on page 23 of 
their brief as follows : 
"* * * Whatever may be the justification of 
this practice with respect to highly profitable enter-
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prises that have reached full earning power, it is 
abundantly clear, under court decisions of every 
state, that valuation based upon earning power is 
peculiarly appropriate to the enterprises here under 
discussion. This is not because they are cooperatives 
but because of the kind of territory in which they 
operate. A stock corporation organized for profit 
and operating in similar territory, should of course 
be assessed on the same basis and with the same re-
sults. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
Erroneously, plaintiffs seem to imply that the special 
advantage accorded them is not because of their coopera-
tive status, but because of the geographical territory served. 
Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, 
as amended, clearly specify the basis for the exemption as 
being the, cooperative status., and at that, a particular genus 
of cooperative. 
However, the plaintiffs do consider it but equitable that 
stock companies operating in like territory should be as-
sessed on the same basis as the plaintiffs, and with the 
same results. Be that as it may, the Legislature was 
prompted by no such principle of equality when it enacted 
the legislation in question. The special exemptions and 
limitations therein are restricted to the few identified. 
In Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272, this 
Court held: 
"* * * The power of classification is not 
precluded by a constitutional provision that taxation 
be equal and uniform, but the fact that a statute 
makes no distinction between those in a class does 
not of itself justify special exemptions, additional 
deductions, or lower rates to those within a particu-
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lar class unless the Constitution provides that taxa-
tion shall be uniform 'upon the same class of sub-
jects.' * * * 
"This section [the Montana statute] provides 
one system for assessing the property of national 
banks and another for assessing the moneyed capital 
employed in any other bank. Nationa'l bank stock 
is assessed at its market value, the full value of the 
real estate being deducted. This legislation was held 
constitutional and valid in Hilger v. Moore (Mont.) 
182 Pac. 477, in an exhaustive and well-considered 
opinion. But the Constitution of Montana contains 
an important clause that the Constitution of this 
state does not contain. Section 11 of article 12 of 
the Montana Constitution provides: 'Taxes shall be 
levied and collected by general laws and for public 
purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same 
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax.' Were a similar provision 
in the Utah Constitution, we should without hesita-
tion uphold section 5869 as a valid act of classifica-
tion. Many courts have upheld as valid and notre-
pugnant to the Constitution similar statutory provi-
sions, but an examination of the constitutional pro-
visions upon which these decisions are based will, 
we think, disclose that they are invariably based upon 
a constitutional provision similar to that above 
quoted from the Montana Constitution. Our section 
5869 operates with uniformity upon a class, but the 
difficulty of reconciling it with the Constitution of 
this state is, th~t it is a special privilege, an added 
benefit, to one class which is accorded to no other. 
The section under consideration plainly gives to bank 
stockholders a deduction given to no other class of 
taxpayers. After provision is made for taxing bank 
stock, section 5869 says that in making such assess-
ment there must also be deducted an additional sum 
to be ascertained in the manner therein provided. 
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This is an exception or deduction not accord'ed to 
other classes or groups of taxpayers, and is, there-
fore, beyond any question of doubt, repugnant to the 
Constitution, which provides for uniformity of taxa-
tion. Not only do we find no warrant in the Consti-
tution that permits the deduction made by the Legis-
lature, but, in our opinion, the deduction is prohib-
ited by the Constitution. Suppose the Legislature 
had enacted a law putting farmers in a separate 
class for purposes of taxation, and had given them 
a flat 20 per cent reduction in the assessment of 
their property. Would any one question the invalid-
ity of such a law? It would be rank and indefensible 
class legislation that could not possibly be harmon-
ized with the Constitution. * * *" 
In the case at bar the plaintiffs have been placed in a 
separate class for taxation purposes and given limitations 
and exemptions on the assessment basis of their property. 
Is this not the rank, inequitable, indefensible, class legisla-
tion of the type referred to in the Lynch decision? Certainly, 
for the classification in this case results in discrimination, 
and the legislation permitting the exemption and deduction 
partakes of neither "uniformity" nor "equality," nor is the 
tax impartially laid on all taxpayers, who, absent the stat-
ute, would find themselves occupying the same status before 
the law. 
At this point in our discussion we consider it approp-
riate to analyze the approach of the plaintiffs as set forth 
in their brief. 
Plaintiffs' syllogism is: (1) Earning power is the 
primary element in ascertaining property valuation. (2) 
REA financed telephone and electric cooperatives have 
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low earning power because they serve rural areas. (3) 
Ergo, the property of a cooperative should not be valued for 
taxation purposes in excess of $10 ($50), times the wire 
miles of its system. 
The defendant acknowledges earning power as one 
element in ascertaining property value, recognizes. that the 
plaintiff cooperatives serve rural areas, but questions the 
conclusion as being a non sequitur. Fixing a maximum for 
valuation purposes does not reflect a formula wherein earn-
ing power, or any of the other elements necessary to ascer-
tain full cash value, is applied. What if the earning power 
justifies a valuation in excess of the statutory ceiling? If 
anything, the statutes. in question preclude full considera-
tion of earning power as a factor in valuation. Logic and 
reason give no comfort to the position of plaintiffs. 
POINT II. 
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17, 
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SEC-
TION 11, ARTICLE XIII, OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF UTAH. 
Section 11, Article XIII, of the Constitution of Utah, 
provides in part : 
"* * * It [the State Tax Commission] shall 
assess mines and public utilities and adjust and 
equalize the valuation and assessment of property 
among the several counties. * * *" 
In State ex rel. P. S. C. v. Southern Pacific Co. et al., 
95 U. 84, 79 P. 2d 25, this Court stated : 
"We conclude therefore the Constitution has 
conferred on the State Tax Commission the power 
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of assessment of utilities, which includes fixing of 
valuations on utility property, and that this, duty 
and power cannot be directly exercised by the Leg-
islature or by it conferred on any other officer or 
board, * * * " 
By enacting Sections 16-6-16 and 16-6-17, supra, the 
Utah Legislature has attempted to exercise the power of 
assessment of p1laintiff utilities, including the fixing of the 
valuations of utility property, all in contravention of the 
Constitution and precedent of this court. 
POINT III. 
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17, 
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SEC-
TION 26, ARTICLE VI, OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF UTAH. 
Section 26, Article VI, of the Constitution of Utah, 
provides in part : 
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or spedal laws in the following cases: 
"* * * 
"8. Assessing and collecting taxes. 
"* * * 
"16. Granting to an individual, association or 
corporation any privilege, immunity or franchise. 
"* * * 
"In all cases where a general law can be applic-
able, no special law shall be enacted. * * *" 
A law is special when it is not founded on natural, 
intrinsic, or constitutional distinctions which reasonably 
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justify difference in treatment, or where a classification is 
unrelated to a legitimate object to be accomplished. See 50 
Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 7; 82 C. J. S., Statutes, Sec. 166 and 
cases cited therein; 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
3rd Ed., Sec. 2104. Although the form of the Utah laws 
under consideration is general, the result is "identification" 
rather than legitimate classification. The statutes, by a 
process of selection through counter generalizations, have 
eliminated what might otherwise be natural classifications. 
For example: 
(a) The classification is not broad enough to apply 
to all cooperatives. A cooperative must be financed under 
the REA Act of 1936 before it is entitled to benefit of the 
statutes in question. 
(b) The classification is not broad enough to apply 
to all nonprofit associations financed pursuant to the REA 
Act of 1936. Loans for rural electrification under the REA 
Act of 1936 may be made to "persons, corporations, states, 
territories, and subdivisions and agencies thereof, munici-
palities, peoples' utility districts and cooperative, nonprofit, 
or limited dividend associations, * * * ." See 7 U. S. 
C. A., Section 904, as amended. Loans for rural telephone 
service under the REA Act of 1936 may be made to "persons 
now providing or who may hereafter provide telephone ser-
vice in rural areas and to cooperative, nonprofit, limited 
dividend, or mutual associations." See 7 U. S. C. A., Sec. 
922. 
The fact that cooperatives have been segregated from 
the numerous other participants under the REA program, 
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for purposes of state taxation, can only add to the conclu-
sion that the Utah tax statutes in question constitute special 
legislation. 
(c) The classification is not broad enough to include 
all associations, for profit or otherwise, which serve similar 
territory, own property of an identical nature, enjoy the 
same net profit, or even adopting plaintiffs' theme, have 
the same earning power. 
We are convinced that the equality so fundamental to 
general legislation finds no part in Sections 16-6-16, U. C. 
A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended. The clas-
sifications therein are arbitrary. An underlying legitimate 
object to be accomplished thereby :-enumerate, the Legis-
lature did not ; and imagine, we can not. 
CONCLUSION 
Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 
1953, as amended, are unconstitutional. The legislation: 
(1) Does not permit taxation of all tangible property. 
(2) Does not permit of property valuation in money. 
( 3) Relieves certain property of the burden of taxa-
tion, not otherwise exempted by the Constitution. 
( 4) Does not provide a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment and taxation. 
(5) Usurps the power of assessment of utilities con-
ferred by the Constitution upon the State Tax Commission. 
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( 6) Arbitrarily classifies., constituting special legis-
lation. 
If taxation can be termed one of the most offensive 
powers of government, how much more repulsive is tax leg-
islation which breeds partiality, inequality, special privilege 
and exemption, and creates. a complex wherein all property 
does not bear its just proportion of the burdens of taxation, 
and every person and corporation does not pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property. 
The writ should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
RAYMOND W. GEE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
JOHN G. MARSHALL, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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